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Abstract
Consistent belief functions represent collections of coherent or non-contradictory
pieces of evidence, but most of all they are the counterparts of consistent
knowledge bases in belief calculus. The use of consistent transformations
cs[·] in a reasoning process to guarantee coherence can therefore be desir-
able, and generalizes similar techniques in classical logics. Transformations
can be obtained by minimizing an appropriate distance measure between the
original belief function and the collection of consistent ones. We focus here
on the case in which distances are measured using classical Lp norms, in both
the “mass space” and the “belief space” representation of belief functions.
While mass consistent approximations reassign the mass not focussed on a
chosen element of the frame either to the whole frame or to all supersets of the
element on an equal basis, approximations in the belief space do distinguish
these focal elements according to the “focussed consistent transformation”
principle. The different approximations are interpreted and compared, with
the help of examples.
Keywords: Theory of evidence, belief logic, consistent belief functions,
simplicial complex, Lp norms, consistent transformation.
1. Introduction
Belief functions (b.f.s) [1, 2] are complex objects, in which different and
sometimes contradictory bodies of evidence may coexist, as they mathemat-
ically describe the fusion of possibly conflicting expert opinions or measure-
ments. This is the case, for instance, of the pose estimation problem in
computer vision [? ]. There, image features do not necessary come from the
object of interest, but may be extracted from the background: in such a case,
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the belief functions inferred from those feature will conflict [? ]. Indeed, con-
flict and combinability play a central role in the theory of evidence [3, 4, 5],
and have been recently subject to novel analyses [6, 7, 8].
Consistent knowledge bases and belief functions. Making decisions based
on objects collecting possibly inconsistent evidence, such as belief functions,
is therefore less than trivial. This is a well known problem in classical logics,
where the application of inference rules to inconsistent sets of assumptions or
“knowledge bases” may lead to incompatible conclusions, depending on the
set of assumptions we start our reasoning from [9]. A variety of approaches
have been proposed in this context to solve the problem of inconsistent knowl-
edge bases, such as: fragmenting the latter into maximally consistent sub-
sets; limiting the power of the formalism; or, adopting non-classical semantics
[10, 11]. Even when a knowledge base is formally inconsistent, though, it may
contain potentially useful information. Paris [9] tackles the problem by not
assuming each proposition in the knowledge base as a fact, but by attributing
to it a certain degree of belief in a probability logic approach. This leads to
something similar to a belief function.
Indeed, extensions of classical logics in which propositions are assigned
belief rather than truth values exist [33]. In this “belief logic” framework, a
belief function can be interpreted as the analogous of a knowledge base [12].
But then, what are the counterparts of consistent knowledge bases in the
theory of evidence? To answer that we need to specify the notion of a belief
function “implying” a certain proposition. As we show here, under a rather
sensible definition of such an implication, the class of belief functions which
generalize consistent knowledge bases is uniquely determined as the set of
b.f.s whose non-zero mass “focal elements” have non-empty intersection. We
are therefore allowed to call them consistent belief functions (cs.b.f.s).
Consistent transformation. Analogously to consistent knowledge bases,
consistent b.f.s are characterized by null internal conflict. It may be therefore
be desirable to transform a generic belief function to a consistent one prior to
making a decision, or picking a course of action. A similar “transformation”
problem has been widely studied in both the probabilistic [13, 14, 15, 16] and
possibilistic [17, 18, 19] cases. A sensible approach, in particular, consists of
studying the geometry [20, 21] of the class of b.f.s of interest and projecting
the original belief function onto the corresponding geometric locus.
Indeed, consistent transformations can be built by solving a minimization
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problem of the form:
cs[b] = arg min
cs∈CS
dist(b, cs) (1)
where b is the original belief function, dist an appropriate distance measure
between belief functions, and CS denotes the collection of all consistent b.f.s.
By plugging in different distance functions in (1) we get different consis-
tent transformations. Indeed, Jousselme et al [22] have recently conducted a
very nice survey of the distance or similarity measures so far introduced in
belief calculus, come out with an interesting classification, and proposed a
number of generalizations of known measures. Many of these measures could
be in principle employed to define indifferently consistent transformations or
conditional belief functions [23], or approximate belief functions by necessity
or probability measures. Other similarity measures between belief functions
have been proposed by Shi et al [24], Jiang et al [25], and others [26, 27].
In this paper we focus on what happens when employing classical Lp
norms in the approximation problem. The L∞ norm, in particular, is closely
related to consistent and consonant belief functions.
The region of consistent b.f.s can be expressed as:
CS =
{
b : max
x∈Θ
plb(x) = 1
}
,
i.e., the set of b.f.s for which the L∞ norm of the “plausibility distribution”
or ”contour function” plb(x) is equal to 1. In addition, cs.b.f.s relate to
possibility distributions, and possibility measures Pos are inherently associ-
ated with L∞ as Pos(A) = maxx∈A Pos(x). In recent times, Lp norms have
been successfully employed in different problems such as probability [16] and
possibility [28] transformation/approximation, or conditioning [23, 29].
As the author has proven [30], geometrically, consistent (as well as con-
sonant [31]) belief functions live in a collection of simplices or “simplicial
complex” CS. Each maximal simplex CSx of the consistent complex is as-
sociated with associated with an “ultrafilter” {A ⊇ {x}}, x ∈ Θ of focal
elements. A partial solution has therefore to be found separately for each
maximal simplex of the consistent complex: these partial solutions are later
compared to determine the global approximation(s). In addition, geomet-
ric approximation can be performed in different Cartesian spaces. A belief
function can be represented either by the vector ~b = [b(A), ∅ ( A ( Θ]′ of
its belief values, or the vector of its mass values ~mb = [mb(A), ∅ ( A ( Θ]′.
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We call the set of vectors of the first kind belief space B [21, 32], and the
collection of vectors of the second kind mass space M [23].
Contribution and outline. In this paper, we solve the Lp consistent trans-
formation problem in full generality in both the mass and the belief space,
and discuss the semantics of the results.
After briefly recalling a few basis notions of the theory of evidence, we prove
that consistent belief functions are the counterparts of consistent knowledge
bases in belief logic (Section 2.2). As we investigate the transformation prob-
lem in a geometric framework, we briefly recall in Section 2.7 the geometry
of the simplicial complex of consistent belief functions, and explain how we
need to solve the approximation/transformation problem separately for each
maximal simplex of this complex. We then proceed to solve the L1-, L2- and
L∞-consistent approximation problems in full generality, in both the mass
(Section 3) and the belief (Section 4) space representations. In Section 5 we
compare and interpret the outcomes of Lp approximations in the two frame-
works, with the help of the ternary example. We conclude and discuss the
natural prosecution of this line of research in Section 6.
2. Theory: consistent approximations of belief functions
2.1. Belief functions and belief logic
A basic probability assignment (b.p.a.) on a finite set or frame of discern-
ment Θ is a set function mb : 2
Θ → [0, 1] on 2Θ .= {A ⊆ Θ} s.t. mb(∅) = 0,∑
A⊆Θmb(A) = 1. Subsets of Θ associated with non-zero values of mb are
called focal elements (f.e.), and their intersection is called the core:
Cb .=
⋂
A⊆Θ:mb(A) 6=0
A.
The belief function (b.f.) b : 2Θ → [0, 1] associated with a basic probability
assignment mb on Θ is defined as: b(A) =
∑
B⊆A
mb(B).
A dual mathematical representation of the evidence encoded by a belief func-
tion b is the plausibility function (pl.f.) plb : 2
Θ → [0, 1], A 7→ plb(A) where
the plausibility value plb(A) of an event A is given by plb(A)
.
= 1 − b(Ac) =∑
B∩A 6=∅mb(B) and expresses the amount of evidence not against A.
Generalizations of classical logic in which propositions are assigned prob-
ability values have been proposed in the past. As belief functions naturally
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generalize probability measures, it is quite natural to define non-classical
logic frameworks in which propositions are assigned belief values, rather than
probability values. This approach has been brought forward in particular by
Saffiotti [33], Haenni [12], and others.
In propositional logic, propositions or formulas are either true or false, i.e.,
their truth value T is either 0 or 1 [34]. Formally, an interpretation or model
of a formula φ is a valuation function mapping φ to the truth value “true”
(1). Each formula can therefore be associated with the set of interpretations
or models under which its truth value is 1. If we define the frame of discern-
ment of all the possible interpretations, each formula φ is associated with
the subset A(φ) of this frame which collects all its interpretations. If the
available evidence allows to define a belief function on this frame of possible
interpretations, to each formula A(φ) ⊆ Θ is then naturally assigned a de-
gree of belief b(A(φ)) between 0 and 1 [33, 12], measuring the total amount
of evidence supporting the proposition “φ is true”.
2.2. Semantics of consistent belief functions
In classical logic, a set Φ of formulas or “knowledge base” is said to be
consistent if and only if there does not exist another formula φ such that the
knowledge base implies both the formula and its negation: Φ ` φ, Φ ` ¬φ.
Hence, it is impossible to derive incompatible conclusions from the set of
propositions which form a consistent knowledge base. This is crucial if we
want to derive univocal, non-contradictory conclusions from a given body of
evidence.
A knowledge base in propositional logic Φ = {φ : T (φ) = 1} (where T (φ)
denotes the truth value of proposition φ) corresponds in belief logic [33] to a
belief function, i.e., a set of propositions together with their non-zero belief
values: b = {A ⊆ Θ : b(A) 6= 0}. To determine what consistency amounts to
in such a framework, we need to formalize the notion of proposition implied
by a belief function. One option is to decide that b ` B ⊆ Θ if B is implied
by all the propositions supported by b:
b ` B ⇔ A ⊆ B ∀A : b(A) 6= 0. (2)
An alternative definition requires the proposition B itself to receive non-zero
support by the belief function b:
b ` B ⇔ b(B) 6= 0. (3)
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Whatever definition we choose for such implication relation, we can define
the class of consistent belief functions as the set of b.f.s which cannot imply
contradictory propositions.
Definition 1. A belief function b is consistent if there exists no proposition
A such that both A and its negation Ac are implied by b.
When adopting the implication relation (2), it is easy to see that A ⊆ B ∀A :
b(A) 6= 0 is equivalent to ⋂b(A)6=0 A ⊆ B. Furthermore, as each proposition
with non-zero belief value must by definition contain a focal element C s.t.
mb(C) 6= 0, the intersection of all non-zero belief propositions reduces to that
of all focal elements of b, i.e., the core of b:⋂
b(A) 6=0
A =
⋂
∃C⊆A:mb(C)6=0
A =
⋂
mb(C) 6=0
C = Cb.
Indeed, no matter our definition of implication, the class of consistent belief
functions corresponds to the set of b.f.s whose core is not empty.
Definition 2. A belief function is said consistent if its core is non-empty.
We can prove that, under either definition (2) or definition (3) of the impli-
cation b ` B, Definitions 1 and 2 are equivalent.
Theorem 1. A belief function b : 2Θ → [0, 1] has non-empty core if and only
if there do not exist two complementary propositions A,Ac ⊆ Θ which are
both implied by b in the sense (2).
Proof. A proposition A is implied (2) by b iff Cb ⊆ A. Accordingly, in order
for both A and Ac to be implied by b we would need Cb = ∅. 
Theorem 2. A belief function b : 2Θ → [0, 1] has non-empty core if and only
if there do not exist two complementary propositions A,Ac ⊆ Θ which both
enjoy non-zero support from b, b(A) 6= 0, b(Ac) 6= 0 (i.e., they are implied by
b in the sense (3)).
Proof. By Definition 1, in order for a subset (or proposition, in a propositional
logic interpretation) A ⊆ Θ to have non-zero belief value it has to contain
the core of b: A ⊇ Cb. In order to have both b(A) 6= 0, b(Ac) 6= 0 we need
both to contain the core, but in that case A ∩ Ac ⊇ Cb 6= ∅ which is absurd
as A ∩ Ac = ∅. 
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2.3. Achieving consistency in belief logic: consistent approximation
Belief functions are complex objects, in which different and sometimes
contradictory bodies of evidence coexist, as they may result from the fusion
of possibly conflicting expert opinions and/or measurements. It is reason-
able to conjecture that taking belief functions at face value may lead in some
situations to incorrect/inappropriate decisions.
A variety of approaches have been proposed in the context of classical log-
ics to solve the analogous problem with inconsistent knowledge bases: we
mentioned some of them in the introduction [10, 11]. Paris’ approach [9]
is particularly interesting as it tackles the problem by attributing to each
proposition in the knowledge base a certain degree of belief, leading to some-
thing similar to a belief function.
As consistent belief functions represent consistent knowledge bases in belief
logic, such a mechanism can be be described there as an operator
cs : B → CS, b 7→ cs[b] (4)
where B and CS denote respectively the set of all belief functions, and that
of all cs.b.f.s. Consistent transformations (4) can be built by posing a mini-
mization problem of the form
cs[b] = arg min
cs∈CS
dist(b, cs)
where b is the belief function to approximate and dist is some distance mea-
sure between b.f.s. It is natural to pose this problem in a geometric setup.
2.4. Geometry of belief functions: belief and mass vectors
As belief functions b : 2Θ → [0, 1], b(A) = ∑B⊆Amb(B) are set functions
defined on a the power set 2Θ of a finite space Θ, they are obviously com-
pletely defined by the associate set of 2|Θ|−2 belief values, that we can collect
in a vector ~b = [b(A), ∅ ( A ( Θ]′ (since b(∅) = 0, b(Θ) = 1 for all b.f.s).
They can therefore be represented as points of RN−2, N = 2|Θ| [21]. The set
B of points of RN−2 which correspond to belief functions is an N -dimensional
triangle or simplex called belief space [21], namely: B = Cl(~bA, ∅ ( A ⊆ Θ),
where Cl denotes the convex closure operator
Cl(~b1, ...,~bk) =
{
~b ∈ B : ~b = α1~b1 + · · ·+ αk~bk,
∑
i
αi = 1, αi ≥ 0 ∀i
}
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and ~bA is the vector associated with the categorical [35] belief function bA
assigning all the mass to a single subset A ⊆ Θ: mbA(A) = 1, mbA(B) = 0
for all B 6= A. The vector ~b ∈ B that corresponds to a belief function b has
coordinates mb(A) in the simplex B :
~b =
∑
∅(A⊆Θ
mb(A)~bA.
In the same way, each b.f. is uniquely associated with the related set of mass
values {mb(A), ∅ ( A ⊆ Θ} (Θ this time included). It can therefore be seen
also as a point of RN−1, the vector ~mb of its N − 1 mass components:
~mb =
∑
∅(A⊆Θ
mb(A)~mA, (5)
where ~mA is the vector of mass values associated with the categorical b.f. bA.
The collection M of points which are valid basic probability assignments is
also a simplex, which we can call mass space: M = Cl(~mA, ∅ ( A ⊂ Θ).
2.4.1. Binary example
As an example let us consider a frame of discernment formed by just two
elements, Θ2 = {x, y}. Each b.f. b : 2Θ2 → [0, 1] is completely determined by
its mass/belief values mb(x) = b(x), mb(y) = b(y), as mb(Θ) = 1 −mb(x) −
mb(y) and mb(∅) = 0. We can therefore collect them in a vector of RN−2 = R2
(since N = 22 = 4): ~mb = ~b = [mb(x),mb(y)]
′ = ~b ∈ R2. In this example
mass space and belief space coincide.
Since mb(x) ≥ 0, mb(y) ≥ 0, and mb(x) + mb(y) ≤ 1 we can easily infer
that the set B2 =M2 of all the possible basic probability assignments (belief
functions) on Θ2 can be depicted as the triangle in the Cartesian plane of
Figure 1, whose vertices are the points ~bΘ = ~mΘ = [0, 0]
′, ~bx = ~mx = [1, 0]′,
~by = ~my = [0, 1]
′, which correspond respectively to the vacuous belief function
bΘ (mbΘ(Θ) = 1), the Bayesian b.f. bx with mbx(x) = 1, and the Bayesian
b.f. by with mby(y) = 1. The region P2 of all Bayesian b.f.s on Θ2 is the
diagonal line segment Cl(~mx, ~my) = Cl(~bx,~by).
In the binary case consistent belief functions can have as list of focal elements
either {{x},Θ2} or {{y},Θ2}. Therefore the space of cs.b.f.s CS2 is the union
of two line segments: CS2 = CSx ∪ CSy = Cl(~mΘ, ~mx) ∪ Cl(~mΘ, ~my) =
Cl(~bΘ,~bx) ∪ Cl(~bΘ,~by). It is easy to recognize that CS2 can be synthetically
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Figure 1: Both mass M2 and belief B2 spaces for a binary frame Θ = {x, y} coincide
with the triangle of R2 whose vertices are the mass (belief) vectors associated with the
categorical b.f.s focused on {x}, {y} and Θ, respectively. Consistent b.f.s live in the union
of the two segments CSx = Cl(~mΘ, ~mx) = Cl(~bΘ,~bx) and CSy = Cl(~mΘ, ~my) = Cl(~bΘ,~by).
written in terms of the L∞ (max) norm as
CS2 = {b : min{b(x), b(y)} = 0} = {b : max{plb(x), plb(y)} = 1}. (6)
2.5. The consistent complex
In the general case the geometry of consistent belief functions can be
described by resorting to the notion of simplicial complex [36]. A simplicial
complex is a collection Σ of simplices of arbitrary dimensions possessing the
following properties: 1. if a simplex belongs to Σ, then all its faces of any
dimension belong to Σ; 2. the intersection of any two simplices is a face of
both the intersecting simplices.
It has been proven that [30, 37] the region CS of consistent belief functions
in the belief space is a simplicial complex, the union
CSB =
⋃
x∈Θ
Cl(~bA, A 3 x).
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of a number of (maximal) simplices, each associated with a “maximal ultra-
filter” {A ⊇ {x}}, x ∈ Θ of subsets of Θ (those containing a given element
x). It is not difficult to see that the same holds in the mass space, where the
consistent complex is the union
CSM =
⋃
x∈Θ
Cl(~mA, A 3 x)
of maximal simplices Cl(~mA, A 3 x) formed by the mass vectors associated
with belief functions whose core contains a particular element x of Θ.
2.6. Using Lp norms
The geometry of the binary case hints to a close relationship between
consistent belief functions and Lp norms, in particular the L∞ one (Equation
(6)). It is easy to realize that this holds in general as, since the plausibility
of all elements of their core is 1, plb(x) =
∑
A⊇{x}mb(A) = 1 ∀x ∈ Cb, the
region of consistent b.f.s can be expressed as CS =
{
b : max
x∈Θ
plb(x) = 1
}
,
i.e., the set of b.f.s for which the L∞ norm of the ”contour function” plb(x)
is equal to 1.
This argument is strengthened by the observation that cs.b.f.s relate to pos-
sibility distributions, and possibility measures Pos are inherently related to
L∞ as Pos(A) = maxx∈A Pos(x). It makes therefore sense to conjecture that
a consistent transformation obtained by picking as distance function in the
approximation problem (1) one of the classical Lp norms maybe be meaning-
ful. For vectors ~mb, ~mb′ ∈M representing the b.p.a.s of two belief functions
b, b′, such norms read as:
‖~mb − ~mb′‖L1 .=
∑
∅(B⊆Θ
|mb(B)−mb′(B)|;
‖~mb − ~mb′‖L2 .=
√ ∑
∅(B⊆Θ
(mb(B)−mb′(B))2;
‖~mb − ~mb′‖L∞ .= max∅(B⊆Θ |mb(B)−mb′(B)|,
(7)
while the same norms in the belief space read as:
‖~b− ~b′‖L1 .=
∑
∅(B⊆Θ
|b(B)− b′(B)|; ‖~b− ~b′‖L2 .=
√ ∑
∅(B⊆Θ
(b(B)− b′(B))2;
‖~b− ~b′‖L∞ .= max∅(B⊆Θ |b(B)− b
′(B)|.
(8)
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In recent times, Lp norms have been employed in different problems such
as probability [16] and possibility [28] transformation/approximation, or con-
ditioning [23, 29]. In the probability transformation problem [13, 14, 38],
p[b] = arg minp∈P dist(b, p), the use of Lp norms leads indeed to quite in-
teresting results. The L2 approximation produces the so-called “orthogonal
projection” of b onto P [16]. In addition, the set of L1/L∞ probabilistic
approximations of b coincide with the set of probabilities consistent with b:
{p : p(A) ≥ b(A)} (at least in the binary case).
Consonant approximations of belief functions obtained by minimizing Lp dis-
tances in the mass space have simple interpretations in terms of redistribution
of the mass outside a desired chain A1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ An, |Ai| = i of focal elements
to a single element of the chain, or all in equal terms [28]. Conditional
b.f.s can also be defined by minimizing Lp distances from a “conditioning
simplex” BA = Cl(~bB, ∅ ( B ⊆ A)
/MA = Cl(~mB, ∅ ( B ⊆ A) in the
belief/mass space determined by the conditioning event A [23]. In the mass
space, the obtained conditional b.f.s have natural interpretation in terms of
Lewis’ “general imaging” [39, 40] applied to belief functions.
Figure 2: Left: To minimize the distance of a point from a simplicial complex, we need
to find all the partial solutions (9) on all the maximal simplices in the complex (empty
circles), to later compare these partial solutions and select a global optimum (black circle).
2.7. Consistent approximation on the complex
As the consistent complex CS is a collection of linear spaces (better,
simplices which generate a linear space), solving the problem (1) involves
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finding a number of partial solutions in the belief/mass space
csxB,Lp [b] = arg min~cs∈CSxB
‖~b− ~cs‖Lp , csxM,Lp [mb] = arg min~mcs∈CSxM ‖~m− ~mcs‖Lp ,
(9)
respectively (see Figure 2-left). Then, the distance of b from all such partial
solutions has to be assessed in order to select a global approximation.
3. Calculation: consistent approximation inM
Let us compute the analytical form of all Lp consistent approximations
in the mass space. We start by describing the difference vector ~mb − ~mcs
between the original mass vector and its approximation. Using the notation
~mcs =
∑
B⊇{x},B 6=Θ
mcs(B)~mB, ~mb =
∑
B(Θ
mb(B)~mB
(as in RN−2 mb(Θ) is not included by normalization) the difference vector is
~mb − ~mcs =
∑
B⊇{x},B 6=Θ
(mb(B)−mcs(B))~mB +
∑
B 6⊃{x}
mb(B)~mB (10)
so that its classical Lp norms read as
‖~mb − ~mcs‖ML1 =
∑
B⊇{x},B 6=Θ
|mb(B)−mcs(B)|+
∑
B 6⊃{x}
|mb(B)|,
‖~mb − ~mcs‖ML2 =
√ ∑
B⊇{x},B 6=Θ
|mb(B)−mcs(B)|2 +
∑
B 6⊃{x}
|mb(B)|2,
‖~mb − ~mcs‖ML∞ = max
{
max
B⊇{x},B 6=Θ
|mb(B)−mcs(B)|, max
B 6⊃{x}
|mb(B)|
}
.
(11)
3.1. L1 approximation
Let us tackle first the L1 case. After introducing the variables β(B)
.
=
mb(B)−mcs(B) we can write the L1 norm of the difference vector as
‖~mb − ~mcs‖ML1 =
∑
B⊇{x},B 6=Θ
|β(B)|+
∑
B 6⊃{x}
|mb(B)|, (12)
which is obviously minimized by β(B) = 0, for all B ⊇ {x}, B 6= Θ. Hence:
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Theorem 3. Given an arbitrary belief function b : 2Θ → [0, 1] and an el-
ement x ∈ Θ of the frame, its unique partial L1 consonant approximation
csxM,L1 [mb] in M with core containing x is the consonant b.f. whose mass
distribution coincides with that of b on all the subsets containing x:
mcsxM,L1 [mb]
(B) =
{
mb(B) ∀B ⊇ {x}, B 6= Θ
mb(Θ) + b({x}c) B = Θ. (13)
The mass value for B = Θ comes from normalization, as follows:
mcsxM,L1 [mb]
(Θ) = 1−
∑
B⊇{x},B 6=Θ
mcsxM,L1 [mb]
(B) = mb(Θ) + b({x}c).
The mass of all the subsets not in the desired “principal ultrafilter” {B ⊇
{x}} is simply re-assigned to Θ. A similarity emerges with the case of L1
conditional belief functions [23], when we recall that the set of L1 conditional
belief functions bL1,M(.|A) with respect to A in M is the simplex whose
vertices are each associated with a subset ∅ ( B ⊆ A of the conditional
event A, and have b.p.a. (compare Equation (13)):{
m′(B) = mb(B) + 1− b(A),
m′(X) = mb(X) ∀∅ ( X ( A,X 6= B.
In the L1 conditional case, each vertex of the set of solutions is obtained
by re-assigning the mass not in the conditional event A to a single subset of
A, just as in L1 consistent approximation all the mass not in the principal
ultrafilter {B ⊇ {x}} is re-assigned to the top of the ultrafilter, Θ.
3.1.1. Global approximation
The global L1 consistent approximation in M coincides with the par-
tial approximation (13) at minimal distance from the original mass vector
~mb. By (12) the partial approximation focussed on x has distance b({x}c) =∑
B 6⊃{x}mb(B) from ~mb.
The global L1 approximation(s) form therefore the union of the partial ap-
proximation(s) associated with the maximal plausibility singleton(s):
csL1,M[mb] =
⋃
arg minx b(xc)=arg maxx plb(x)
csxM,L1 [mb]. (14)
This is in accordance with our intuition, as it makes sense to focus on the
singletons which are supported by the strongest evidence.
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3.1.2. A running example
Consider as an example the belief function b with mass assignment
mb(x) = 0.2, mb(y) = 0.1, mb(z) = 0,
mb(x, y) = 0.4, mb(x, z) = 0, mb(y, z) = 0.3, mb(Θ) = 0
(15)
on the ternary frame Θ = {x, y, z}.
Suppose that we seek the L1 approximation of b with core {x}. By Equation
(13) we get the following consonant b.f.:
m′b(x) = 0.2, m
′
b(x, y) = 0.4, m
′
b(x, z) = 0, m
′
b(Θ) = 0.4.
If, instead, we focus on {y} or {z} we get, respectively (see Figure 3):
m′b(y) = 0.1, m
′
b(x, y) = 0.4, m
′
b(y, z) = 0.3, m
′
b(Θ) = 0.2;
m′b(z) = 0, m
′
b(x, z) = 0, m
′
b(y, z) = 0.3, m
′
b(Θ) = 0.7.
Note that the partial approximation on CSz has {y, z} as actual core, and
Figure 3: (a) The belief function (15); (b) its partial L1 consistent approximation in M
focussed on {x}; (c) partial approximation on {y}; (d) partial approximation on {z}.
that (b) and (d) are actually consonant (a special case of consistent b.f.),
stressing the close relation between consonant and consistent approximation.
Since plb(x) = 0.6, plb(y) = 0.8, plb(z) = 0.3, by (14) the global L1 approxi-
mation of (15) is the partial approximation with core containing {y}. We can
notice how the global approximation is visually much closer to the original
b.f. than the partial ones, in terms of the structure of its focal elements.
3.2. L∞ approximation
In the L∞ case ‖~mb − ~mcs‖ML∞ = max
{
max
B⊇{x},B 6=Θ
|β(B)|, max
C 6⊃{x}
mb(C)
}
.
The L∞ norm of the difference vector is obviously minimized by {β(B)} such
that: |β(B)| ≤ maxC 6⊃{x}mb(C) for all B ⊇ {x}, B 6= Θ, i.e.,
− max
C 6⊃{x}
mb(C) ≤ mb(B)−mcs(B) ≤ max
C 6⊃{x}
mb(C) ∀ B ⊇ {x}, B 6= Θ.
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Theorem 4. Given an arbitrary belief function b : 2Θ → [0, 1] and an ele-
ment x ∈ Θ of the frame, its partial L∞ consistent approximations csxM,L∞ [mb]
with core containing x in M are those whose mass values on all the subsets
containing x differ from the original ones by the maximum mass of the subsets
not in the ultrafilter: for all B ⊃ {x}, B 6= Θ
mb(B)− max
C 6⊃{x}
mb(C) ≤ mcsxM,L∞ [mb](B) ≤ mb(B) + maxC 6⊃{x}mb(C). (16)
Clearly this set of solutions can also include pseudo belief functions. Also,
a comparison of Equations (16) and (13) shows that the barycenter of the
partial L∞ approximations coincides with the partial L1 approximation, re-
assigning all the mass outside the ultrafilter to the whole frame.
3.2.1. Global approximation
Once again, the global L∞ consistent approximation inM coincides with
the partial approximation (16) at minimal distance from the original b.p.a.
~mb. The partial approximation focussed on x has distance maxC 6⊃{x}mb(C)
from ~mb. The global L∞ approximation is therefore the (union of the) par-
tial approximation(s) associated with the singleton(s) which minimize the
maximal mass outside the ultrafilter:
csM,L∞ [mb] =
⋃
arg minx maxC 6⊃{x}mb(C)
csxM,L∞ [mb]. (17)
Global L∞ solutions are not totally unrelated to their L1 peers, as maximizing
the plausibility of the core as in (14) involves minimizing the total mass
outside the ultrafilter.
3.2.2. Running example
For the b.f. (15) of our running example, the maximal mass outside the
ultrafilter in x is
max
C 6⊃x
mb(C) = max
{
mb(y),mb(z),mb(y, z)
}
= mb(y, z) = 0.3,
so that the set of L∞ consistent approximations with core containing {x} is
such that
mb(x)−mb(y, z) ≤ m′b(x) ≤ mb(x) +mb(y, z)
mb(x, y)−mb(y, z) ≤ m′b(x, y) ≤ mb(x, y) +mb(y, z)
mb(x, z)−mb(y, z) ≤ m′b(x, z) ≤ mb(x, z) +mb(y, z)
≡

−0.1 ≤ m′b(x) ≤ 0.5
0.1 ≤ m′b(x, y) ≤ 0.7
−0.3 ≤ m′b(x, z) ≤ 0.3.
(18)
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This set is clearly not entirely admissible. The same can be verified for partial
approximations with cores containing {y} and {z}, for which
max
C 6⊃y
mb(C) = mb(x) = 0.2, max
C 6⊃z
mb(C) = mb(x, y) = 0.4.
Therefore, the global L∞ approximations of (15) are the partial ones whose
core contains y (as it was the case for the global L1 approximation).
3.3. L2 approximation
In order to find the L2 consistent approximation(s) inM it is convenient
to recall that the minimal L2 distance between a point and a vector space is
attained by the point of the vector space V such that the difference vector is
orthogonal to all the generators ~gi of V :
arg min
~q∈V
‖~p− ~q‖2 = qˆ ∈ V : 〈~p− qˆ, ~gi〉 = 0 ∀i
whenever ~p ∈ Rm, V = span(~gi, i).
Instead of minimizing the L2 norm of the difference vector ‖~mb − ~mcs‖ML2
we can just impose the orthogonality of the difference vector itself ~mb − ~mcs
and the subspace CSxM associated with consistent mass functions focused
on {x}. Clearly the generators of such linear space are the vectors in M:
~mB − ~m{x}, for all B ) {x}.
Theorem 5. Consider an arbitrary belief function b : 2Θ → [0, 1] and an
element x ∈ Θ of the frame. When using the (N − 2)-dimensional repre-
sentation of mass vectors (5), its unique L2 partial consistent approximation
in M with core containing x coincides with its partial L1 approximation:
csxM,L2 [mb] = cs
x
M,L1 [mb]. When representing belief functions as mass vec-
tors ~mb of RN−1 (B = Θ included)
~mb =
∑
∅(B⊆Θ
mb(B)~mB (19)
the partial L2 approximation of b is obtained by equally redistributing to each
element of the ultrafilter {B ⊇ {x}} an equal fraction of the mass of focal
elements originally not in it:
mcsxM,L2 [mb]
(B) = mb(B) +
b({x}c)
2|Θ|−1
∀B ⊇ {x}. (20)
The partial L2 approximation in RN−1 redistributes the mass equally to all
the elements of the ultrafilter.
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3.3.1. Global approximation
The global L2 consistent approximation in M is, as usual, given by the
partial approximation (20) at minimal L2 distance from ~mb. In the N − 2
representation, by definition of L2 norm inM (11), the partial approximation
focussed on x has distance from ~mb
(b(xc))2 +
∑
B 6⊃{x}
(mb(B))
2 =
( ∑
B 6⊃{x}
mb(B)
)2
+
∑
B 6⊃{x}
(mb(B))
2,
which is minimized by the singleton(s) arg min
x
∑
B 6⊃{x}
(mb(B))
2. Therefore:
csM,L2 [mb] =
⋃
arg minx
∑
B 6⊃{x}(mb(B))2
csxM,L2 [mb].
In the N − 1-dimensional representation, instead,∑
B⊇{x},B 6=Θ
[
mb(B)−
(
mb(B) +
b(xc)
2|Θ|−1
)]2
+
∑
B 6⊃{x}
(mb(B))
2 =
∑
B⊇{x},B 6=Θ
( b(xc)
2|Θ|−1
)2
+
∑
B 6⊃{x}
(mb(B))
2 =
(
∑
B 6⊃{x}mb(B))
2
2|Θ|−1
+
∑
B 6⊃{x}
(mb(B))
2
(21)
which is minimized by the same singleton(s). In any case, even though (in
the N − 2 representation) the partial L1 and L2 approximations coincide,
the global approximations in general may fall on different components of the
consonant complex.
3.3.2. Running example
For the usual example b.f. (15), by Equation (20) the L2 partial approxi-
mations with cores containing x, y and x respectively have mass assignments:
m′b(x) = 0.3, m
′
b(x, y) = 0.5, m
′
b(x, z) = 0.1, m
′
b(Θ) = 0.1
m′b(y) = 0.15, m
′
b(x, y) = 0.45, m
′
b(y, z) = 0.35, m
′
b(Θ) = 0.05;
m′b(z) = 0.175, m
′
b(x, z) = 0.175, m
′
b(y, z) = 0.475, m
′
b(Θ) = 0.175,
since b(xc) = 1−plb(x) = 0.4, b(xc) = 1−plb(x) = 0.4, b(xc) = 1−plb(x) = 0.4
and 2|Θ|−1 = 4 (see Figure 4).
Note that, unlike the corresponding L1 approximation, the partial L2
approximation on {z} has indeed the singleton as core. Also, as L2 approx-
imation redistributes mass evenly to all the focal elements in the desired
17
Figure 4: (a) The b.f. (15); (b) its partial L2 consistent approximation in M, focussed
on {x}; (c) L2 partial approximation on {y}; (d) L2 partial approximation on {z}.
ultrafilter, all partial approximations contain all possible f.e.s. As for the
global solution
(b(xc))2 = 0.16,
∑
B 6⊃x
(mb(B))
2 = 0.12 + 0.32 = 0.01 + 0.09 = 0.1,
(b(yc))2 = 0.04,
∑
B 6⊃y
(mb(B))
2 = 0.22 = 0.04,
(b(zc))2 = 0.49,
∑
B 6⊃z
(mb(B))
2 = 0.22 + 0.12 + 0.42 = 0.04 + 0.01 + 0.16 = 0.21,
and the L2 norm (21) is minimized, once again, by the partial solution on
{y} (as visually confirmed by Figure 4).
4. Calculation: approximation in the belief space
4.1. L1/L2 approximations
We have seen that in the mass space (at least in its N −2 representation,
Theorem 5) the L1 and L2 approximations coincide. This is true in the
belief space in the general case as well. We will gather some intuition on
the general solution by considering first the slightly more complex case of a
ternary frame: Θ = {x, y, z}. In this Section we will use the notation:
~cs =
∑
B⊇{x}
mcs(B)~bB, ~b =
∑
B(Θ
mb(B)~bB.
In the case of an arbitrary frame a cs.b.f. cs ∈ CSxB is a solution of the
L2 approximation problem if, again, ~b − ~cs is orthogonal to all generators
{~bB −~bΘ = ~bB, {x} ⊆ B ( Θ} of CSxB: 〈~b − ~cs,~bB〉 = 0 ∀B : {x} ⊆ B ( Θ.
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As ~b− ~cs = ∑A(Θ(mb(A)−mcs(A))~bA we get ∑
A⊇{x}
β(A)〈~bA,~bB〉+
∑
A 6⊃{x}
mb(A)〈~bA,~bB〉 = 0 ∀B : {x} ⊆ B ( Θ, (22)
where once again β(A) = mb(A)−mcs(A). In the L1 case, the minimization
problem is (using again the notation ~cs =
∑
B⊇{x}mcs(B)~bB)
arg min
mcs(.)
{ ∑
B⊇{x}
∣∣∣∣ ∑
A⊆B
mb(A)−
∑
A⊆B,A⊇{x}
mcs(A)
∣∣∣∣}
= arg min
β(.)
{ ∑
B⊇{x}
∣∣∣∣ ∑
A⊆B,A⊇{x}
β(A) +
∑
A⊆B,A 6⊃{x}
mb(A)
∣∣∣∣}
which is clearly solved by setting all addenda to zero, obtaining ∑
A⊆B,A⊇{x}
β(A) +
∑
A⊆B,A 6⊃{x}
mb(A) = 0 ∀B : {x} ⊆ B ( Θ. (23)
An interesting fact emerges when comparing the linear systems for L1
and L2 in the ternary case Θ = {x, y, x}:
3β(x) + β(x, y) + β(x, z) +mb(y) +mb(z) = 0
β(x) + β(x, y) +mb(y) = 0
β(x) + β(x, z) +mb(z) = 0
β(x) = 0
β(x) + β(x, y) +mb(y) = 0
β(x) + β(x, z) +mb(z) = 0.
(24)
The solution is the same for both, due to the fact that the second linear
system is obtained from the first one by a linear transformation of rows.
We just need to replace the first equation e1 in the first system with the
difference: e1 7→ e1 − e2 − e3. This holds in the general case, too.
Lemma 1.
∑
C⊇B
〈~bC ,~bA〉(−1)|C\B| = 1 whenever A ⊆ B, 0 otherwise.
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Corollary 1. The linear system (22) can be reduced to the system (23)
through the following linear transformation of rows:
rowB 7→
∑
C⊇B
rowC(−1)|C\B|. (25)
Proof. If we apply the linear transformation (25) to the system (22) we get∑
C⊇B
[ ∑
A⊇{x}
β(A)〈~bA,~bC〉+
∑
A 6⊃{x}
mb(A)〈~bA,~bC〉
]
(−1)|C\B|
=
∑
A⊇{x}
β(A)
∑
C⊇B
〈~bA,~bC〉(−1)|C\B| +
∑
A 6⊃{x}
mb(A)
∑
C⊇B
〈~bA,~bC〉(−1)|C\B|
∀B : {x} ⊆ B ( Θ. Therefore by Lemma 1 we get{ ∑
A⊇{x},A⊆B
β(A) +
∑
A 6⊃{x},A⊆B
mb(A) = 0 ∀B : {x} ⊆ B ( Θ,
i.e., the system of equations (23). 
4.1.1. Form of the solution
To obtain both the L2 and the L1 consistent approximations of b it then
suffices to solve the system (23) associated with the L1 norm.
Theorem 6. The unique solution of the linear system (23) is: β(A) =
−mb(A \ {x}) for all A : {x} ⊆ A ( Θ.
We can prove it by simple substitution, as system (23) becomes:
−
∑
B⊆A,B⊇{x}
mb(B \ {x}) +
∑
B⊆A,B 6⊃{x}
mb(B)
= −
∑
C⊆A\{x}
mb(C) +
∑
B⊆A,B 6⊃{x}
mb(B) = 0.
Therefore, according to what discussed in Section 2.7, the partial consis-
tent approximations of b on the maximal component CSxB of the consistent
complex have b.p.a.
mcsxB,L1 [b]
(A) = mcsxB,L2 [b]
(A) = mb(A)− β(A) = mb(A) +mb(A \ {x})
20
for all events A such that {x} ⊆ A ( Θ. As for the mass of Θ, by normal-
ization: mcsxB,L1/L2 [b]
(Θ) =
= 1−
∑
{x}⊆A(Θ
mcsxB,L1/L2 [b]
(A) = 1−
∑
{x}⊆A(Θ
(
mb(A) +mb(A \ {x})
)
= 1−
∑
{x}⊆A(Θ
mb(A)−
∑
{x}⊆A(Θ
mb(A \ {x})
= 1−
∑
A 6=Θ,{x}c
mb(A) = mb({x}c) +mb(Θ)
as all events B 6⊃ {x} can be written as B = A \ {x} for A = B ∪ {x}.
Corollary 2.
mcsxB,L1 [b]
(A) = mcsxB,L2 [b]
(A) = mb(A) +mb(A \ {x})
∀x ∈ Θ, and for all A s.t. {x} ⊆ A ⊆ Θ.
4.1.2. Global L1 and L2 approximations
To find the consistent approximation of b we need to work out which of
the partial approximations csxL1/2 [b] has minimal distance from b.
Theorem 7. Given an arbitrary belief function b : 2Θ → [0, 1], its global
L1 consistent approximation in the belief space is its partial approximation
associated with the singleton:
arg min
x
{ ∑
A⊆{x}c
b(A), x ∈ Θ
}
. (26)
In the binary case (Θ = {x, y}) the optimal singleton cores (26) simplify as:
arg min
x
∑
A⊆{x}c
b(A) = arg min
x
mb({x}c) = arg max
x
plb(x),
and the global approximation falls on the component of the consistent com-
plex associated with the element of maximal plausibility. Unfortunately, in
the case of an arbitrary frame Θ the element (26) is not necessarily the
maximal plausibility element:
arg min
{ ∑
A⊆{x}c
b(A), x ∈ Θ
}
6= arg max{plb(x), x ∈ Θ
}
,
as a simple counterexample can prove. As for the L2 case:
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Theorem 8. Given an arbitrary belief function b : 2Θ → [0, 1], its global
L2 consistent approximation in the belief space is its partial approximation
associated with the singleton:
arg min
x
{ ∑
A⊆{x}c
(
b(A)
)2
, x ∈ Θ
}
. (27)
Once again, in the binary case the optimal singleton cores (27) specialize as:
arg min
x
∑
A⊆{x}c
(b(A))2 = arg min
x
(mb({x}c))2 = arg max
x
plb(x)
and the global approximation for L2 also falls on the component of the con-
sistent complex associated with the element of maximal plausibility, while
this is not generally true for an arbitrary frame.
4.1.3. Running example
According to Equation (33), for the belief function (15) of our running
example the partial L1/L2 consistent approximations in B with core contain-
ing {x}, {y} and {z}, respectively, have mass assignments (see Figure 5):
m′b(x) = 0.2, m
′
b(x, y) = 0.5, m
′
b(x, z) = 0, m
′
b(Θ) = 0.3;
m′b(y) = 0.1, m
′
b(x, y) = 0.6, m
′
b(y, z) = 0.3, m
′
b(Θ) = 0;
m′b(z) = 0, m
′
b(x, z) = 0.2, m
′
b(y, z) = 0.4, m
′
b(Θ) = 0.4,
(28)
We can note that kind of approximation tends to penalize the smallest,
Figure 5: (a) The belief function (15); (b) its partial L1/L2 consistent approximation
in B, focussed on {x}; (c) partial L1/L2 partial approximation on {y}; (d) partial L1/L2
partial approximation on {z}.
singleton element of the ultrafilter {B ⊇ x}: this is due to the fact that
m′b(x) = mb(x), while the masses of all the other elements of the filter are
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increased. As for global approximations we have, for L1:∑
A⊆{x}c b(A) = b(y) + b(z) + b(y, z) = 0.1 + 0 + 0.4 = 0.5,∑
A⊆{y}c b(A) = b(x) + b(z) + b(x, z) = 0.2 + 0 + 0.2 = 0.4,∑
A⊆{z}c b(A) = b(x) + b(y) + b(x, y) = 0.2 + 0.1 + 0.7 = 1,
which is minimized by the partial solution in y. For L2:∑
A⊆{x}c
(
b(A)
)2
= 0.01 + 0.16 = 0.17,∑
A⊆{y}c
(
b(A)
)2
= 0.04 + 0.04 = 0.08,∑
A⊆{z}c
(
b(A)
)2
= 0.04 + 0.01 + 0.49 = 0.54,
which is also minimized by the same partial solution. This is not necessarily
the case, in general.
4.2. L∞ consistent approximation
While the partial L1- and L2-consistent approximations in the belief space
are pointwise and coincide, the set of partial L∞-approximations for each
component CSxB of the consistent complex form a polytope whose center of
mass is exactly equal to csxB,L1 [b] = cs
x
B,L2 [b].
4.2.1. General solution
By applying the expression (8) of the L∞ norm to the difference vector
~b− ~cs in the belief space, where cs is a consistent b.f. with core containing x,
we obtain maxA(Θ
{∣∣∑
B⊆Amb(B) −
∑
B⊆A,B⊇{x}mcs(B)
∣∣}. Therefore, the
partial L∞ consistent approximation with core containing x is:
csxB,L∞ [b] = arg min
mcs(.)
max
A(Θ
{∣∣∣∣∑
B⊆A
mb(B)−
∑
B⊆A,B⊇{x}
mcs(B)
∣∣∣∣}.
Again, maxA(Θ has as lower limit the value associated with the largest norm
which does not depend on mcs(.), i.e.,
max
A(Θ
{∣∣∣∣∑
B⊆A
mb(B)−
∑
B⊆A,B⊇{x}
mcs(B)
∣∣∣∣} ≥ b({x}c)
or equivalently max
A(Θ
{∣∣∣∣ ∑
B⊆A,B⊇{x}
β(B) +
∑
B⊆A,B 6⊃{x}
mb(B)
∣∣∣∣} ≥ b({x}c).
In the above constraint only the expressions associated with B ⊇ {x} contain
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variable terms. Therefore the desired optimal values of the variables {β(B)}
are such that:
∣∣∣∣ ∑
B⊆A,B⊇{x}
β(B) +
∑
B⊆A,B 6⊃{x}
mb(B)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ b({x}c) ∀A : {x} ⊆ A ( Θ.
(29)
After introducing the change of variables
γ(A)
.
=
∑
B⊆A,B⊇{x}
β(B) (30)
system (29) trivially reduces to
{∣∣∣γ(A) + ∑
B⊆A,B 6⊃{x}
mb(B)
∣∣∣ ≤ b({x}c) for all
A such that {x} ⊆ A ( Θ, whose solution
−b(xc)−
∑
B⊆A,B 6⊃{x}
mb(B) ≤ γ(A) ≤ b(xc)−
∑
B⊆A,B 6⊃{x}
mb(B) (31)
defines a high-dimensional “rectangle” in the space of the solutions {γ(A), {x} ⊆
A ( Θ}.
In the mass assignment mcs(.) of the desired approximations, as we can
clearly see in the running ternary example, the solution set is polytope whose
vertices do not appear to have straightforward interpretations. On the other
hand, the barycenter of this polytope is easy to compute and interpret.
4.2.2. Barycenter of the L∞ solution and global approximation
The center of mass of the set of solutions (31) to the L∞ consistent ap-
proximation problem is clearly γ(A) = −
∑
B⊆A,B 6⊃{x}
mb(B), {x} ⊆ A ( Θ,
which reads in the space of the variables {β(A), {x} ⊆ A ( Θ} as{ ∑
B⊆A,B⊇{x}
β(B) = −
∑
B⊆A,B 6⊃{x}
mb(B), {x} ⊆ A ( Θ.
But this is exactly the linear system (23) which determines the L1/L2 con-
sistent approximation csxB,L1/2 [b] of b onto CSxB.
Besides, the L∞ distance between b and CSxB is minimal for the element x
which minimizes ‖~b− ~csxB,L∞‖∞ = b({x}c). In conclusion,
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Theorem 9. Given a belief function b : 2Θ → [0, 1], and an element of its
frame x ∈ Θ, its partial L1/L2 approximation onto any given component CSxB
of the consistent complex CSB in the belief space is also the geometric barycen-
ter of the set its L∞ consistent approximations on the same component. Its
global L∞ consistent approximations in B form the union of the partial L∞
approximations associated with the maximal plausibility element(s) x ∈ Θ.
4.3. Running example
For the usual belief function (15) on the ternary frame, the set of partial
L∞ solutions (31) focussed on x becomes:
b(x)− b(xc) ≤ mcs(x) ≤ b(x) + b(xc),
b(x, y)− b(xc) ≤ mcs(x) +mcs(x, y) ≤ b(x, y) + b(xc),
b(x, z)− b(xc) ≤ mcs(x) +mcs(x, z) ≤ b(x, z) + b(xc),
whose 23 = 8 vertices (represented as vectors [mcs(x),mcs(x, y),mcs(x, z),mcs(Θ)]
′)[
b(x)− b(xc), b(x, y)− b(x), b(x, z)− b(x),
1 + b(x) + b(xc)− b(x, y)− b(x, z)],[
b(x)− b(xc), b(x, y)− b(x), b(x, z)− b(x) + 2b(xc),
1 + b(x)− b(x, y)− b(x, z)− b(xc)],[
b(x)− b(xc), b(x, y)− b(x) + 2b(xc), b(x, z)− b(x),
1 + b(x)− b(x, y)− b(x, z)− b(xc)],[
b(x)− b(xc), b(x, y)− b(x) + 2b(xc), b(x, z)− b(x) + 2b(xc),
1 + b(x)− b(x, y)− b(x, z)− 3b(xc)],[
b(x) + b(xc), b(x, y)− b(x)− 2b(xc), b(x, z)− b(x)− 2b(xc),
1 + b(x)− b(x, y)− b(x, z) + 3b(xc)],[
b(x) + b(xc), b(x, y)− b(x)− 2b(xc), b(x, z)− b(x),
1 + b(x)− b(x, y)− b(x, z) + b(xc)],[
b(x) + b(xc), b(x, y)− b(x), b(x, z)− b(x)− 2b(xc),
1 + b(x)− b(x, y)− b(x, z) + b(xc)],[
b(x) + b(xc), b(x, y)− b(x), b(x, z)− b(x),
1 + b(x)− b(x, y)− b(x, z)− b(xc)],
do not appear to be particularly meaningful. Their barycenter, instead,[
b(x), b(x, y)− b(x), b(x, z)− b(x), 1 + b(x)− b(x, y)− b(x, z)]
=
[
mb(x),mb(x, y) +mb(y),mb(x, z) +mb(z),mb(y, z) +mb(Θ)
] (32)
clearly coincides with the focussed consistent approximation on x. The same
holds for the barycenters of the L∞ approximations focussed on y and z (see
Equation (28)).
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5. Discussion
Let us conclude by discussing the interpretation of the consistent approxi-
mations derives in the mass and belief space, and by comparing their features
and geometry, with the help of the usual ternary example.
5.1. Approximation in the mass space and general imaging in belief revision
As it is the case for geometric conditioning in the mass space [23], consis-
tent approximations in the mass space can be interpreted as a generalization
of Lewis’ imaging approach to belief revision, originally formulated in the
context of probabilities [39]. The idea behind imaging is that, upon observ-
ing that some state x ∈ Θ is impossible, you transfer the probability initially
assigned to x completely towards the remaining state you deem the most
similar to x [41]. Peter Ga¨rdenfors [40] extended Lewis’ idea by allowing a
fraction λi of the probability of such state x to be re-distributed to all re-
maining states xi (
∑
i λi = 1).
In the case of partial consistent approximation of belief functions, the mass
mb(A) of each focal element not in the desired ultrafilter {A ⊇ {x}} should
be re-assigned to the “closest” focal element in the latter. The partial L1
consistent approximation in M amounts to admitting ignorance about the
closeness of focal elements, and re-assigning all the mass outside the filter to
the whole frame, therefore increasing the uncertainty of the state. If such
ignorance is expressed by assigning instead equal weight λ(A) to each A ∈ C,
the resulting partial consistent approximation is the unique partial L2 ap-
proximation, the barycenter of the polytope of L1 partial approximations.
5.2. Partial L1/L2 approximations as focused consistent transformations
The expression of the the basic probability assignment of the L1/L2 con-
sistent approximations of b (Corollary 2) is simple and elegant. It also has a
straightforward interpretation: to get a consistent belief function focused on
a singleton x, the mass contribution of all events B such that B ∪ {x} = A
coincide is assigned indeed to A. But there are just two such events: A itself,
and A \ {x}.
The partial consistent approximation of a belief function on a frame Θ =
{x, y, z, w} with core {x} is illustrated in Figure 6. The b.f. with focal
elements {y}, {y, z}, and {x, z, w} is transformed by the map
{y} 7→ {x} ∪ {y} = {x, y},
{y, z} 7→ {x} ∪ {y, z} = {x, y, z},
{x, z, w} 7→ {x} ∪ {x, z, w} = {x, z, w}
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Figure 6: A belief function (a) and its L1/2 consistent approximation in B with core {x}
(b).
into the consistent b.f. with focal elements {x, y}, {x, y, z}, and {x, z, w} and
the same b.p.a. The partial solutions to the L1/L2 consistent approximation
problem turn out to be related to the classical inner consonant approxima-
tions of a b.f. b, i.e., the set of consonant belief functions co such that
co(A) ≥ b(A) ∀A ⊆ Θ
(or equivalently plco(A) ≤ plb(A) ∀A). Dubois and Prade [17] proved indeed
that such an approximation exists iff b is consistent. However, when b is not
consistent a “focused consistent transformation” can be applied to get a new
belief function b′ such that
mb′(A ∪ xi) = mb(A) ∀A ⊆ Θ (33)
and xi is the element of Θ with highest plausibility.
Clearly then, the results of Theorem and Corollary say that the L1/L2 consis-
tent approximation onto each component CSxB of CSB generates the consistent
transformation focused on x.
5.3. Improper solutions and unnormalized belief functions
In some cases, improper partial solutions (in the sense that they poten-
tially include negative mass assignments) can be generated by the Lp min-
imization process. This situation is not entirely new. For instance, outer
consonant approximations [17] also include infinitely many improper solu-
tions: nevertheless, only the subset of acceptable solutions is retained. As
in the consonant case [28], the set of all (admissible and not) solutions is
typically much simpler to describe geometrically, in terms of simplices or
polytopes. Computing the set of proper approximations in all cases requires
significant further effort, which for reasons of clarity and length we reserve
for the near future.
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Additionally, in this work only “normalized” belief functions, i.e., b.f.s whose
mass of the empty set is nil, are considered. Unnormalized b.f.s, however,
play an important role in the TBM [42] as the mass of the empty set is an
indicator of conflicting evidence. The analysis of the unnormalized case is
also left to future work for lack of sufficient space here.
5.4. Mass- versus belief- consistent approximations
Summarizing, in the mass space:
• the partial L1 consistent approximation focussed on a certain element
x of the frame is obtained by reassigning all the mass b(xc) outside the
filter to Θ;
• the global approximation is associated, as expected, with cores con-
taining the maximal plausibility element(s) of Θ;
• the L∞ approximation generates a “rectangle” of partial approxima-
tions, with barycenter in the L1 partial approximation;
• the corresponding global approximations spans the component(s) fo-
cussed on the element(s) x such that maxB 6⊃xmb(B) is minimal;
• the L2 partial approximation coincides with the L1 one in the N − 2
representation;
• in the N − 1 representation the L2 partial approximation reassigns
the mass outside the desired filter (b(xc)) to each element of the filter
focussed on x on equal basis;
• global approximations in the L2 case are of more difficult interpretation.
In the belief space:
• partial L1/L2 approximations coincide on each component of the con-
sistent complex;
• such partial L1/L2 approximation turns out to be the consistent trans-
formation [17] focused on the considered element of the frame: for all
events A such that {x} ⊆ A ⊆ Θ
mcsxB,L1 [b]
(A) = mcsxB,L2 [b]
(A) = mb(A) +mb(A \ {x});
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• the corresponding global solutions have not in general as core the maxi-
mal plausibility element, and may lie in general on different components
of CS; the L1 global consistent approximation is associated with the
singleton(s) x ∈ Θ such that: xˆ = arg minx
∑
A⊆{x}c b(A), while the L2
global approximation is associated with xˆ = arg minx
∑
A⊆{x}c(b(A))
2
which do not appear to have simple epistemic interpretations;
• the set of partial L∞ solutions form a polytope on each component of
the consistent complex, whose center of mass lies on the partial L1/L2
approximation;
• the global L∞ solutions fall on the component(s) associated with the
maximal plausibility element(s), and their center of mass, when such
element is unique, is the consistent transformation focused on the max-
imal plausibility singleton [17].
By comparing the behavior of the two classes of approximations we can
notice a general pattern. Approximations in both mass and belief space
reassign the mass outside the filter focussed on x, in different ways. However,
mass consistent approximations reassign this mass b(xc) either to no focal
element in the filter (i.e., to Θ) or to all on an equal basis. They do not
distinguish between focal elements w.r.t. their set-theoretic relationships
with subsets B 6⊃ x outside the filter. In opposition, approximations in
the belief space do distinguish them according to the focussed consistent
transformation principle.
5.5. Comparison on a ternary example
To conclude, let us graphically illustrate the different approximations for
the belief function of the running ternary example. Figure 7 illustrates the
different partial consistent approximations in the simplex Cl(~mx, ~mx,y, ~mx,z, ~mΘ)
of consistent belief functions focussed on x in a ternary frame, for the belief
function (15). This is the solid black tetrahedron of Figure 7.
The set of partial L∞ approximations in M (18) is represented by the
green cube in the Figure. As expected, it does not entirely fall inside the
tetrahedron of admissible consistent belief functions. Its barycenter (the
green star) coincides with the L1 partial consistent approximation in M.
The L2 approximation inM does also coincide, as expected, with the L1 ap-
proximation. There seems to be a strong case for the latter approximation,
whose natural interpretation in terms of mass assignment is the following:
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all the mass outside the desired ultrafilter {B ⊇ x} is reassigned to Θ, in-
creasing the overall uncertainty of the belief state.
The L2,M partial approximation in the N − 1 representation is distinct
from the previous ones, but still falls inside the polytope of L∞ partial ap-
proximations (green cube) and is admissible, as it falls in the interior of the
simplicial component Cl(~mx, ~mx,y, ~mx,z, ~mΘ). It itself possesses a strong in-
terpretation, as the overall mass not in the desired ultrafilter focused on x is
equally redistributed to all elements of the filter.
Figure 7: The simplex (solid black tetrahedron) Cl(~mx, ~mx,y, ~mx,z, ~mΘ) of consistent belief
functions focussed on x, and the related Lp partial consistent approximations of a generic
b.f. on Θ = {x, y, z}.
Finally, the unique L1/L2 partial approximation in B of Equation (28)
(which is also the barycenter (32) of the partial L∞ approximations in B)
is shown as a red square. Just as the L1/L2 approximation in M (green
star), it attributes zero mass to {x, z}, which fails to be supported by any
focal element of the original belief function. As a result, they both fall on
the border of the tetrahedron of admissible consistent b.f.s focussed on x
(highlighted in yellow).
6. Conclusions
Consistent belief functions represent consistent knowledge bases in the
belief logic interpretation of the theory of evidence. Given a belief function
inferred from conflicting expert judgments or measurements, the use of a
consistent transformation prior to making a decision may be desirable. In this
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paper we solved the specific instance of the consistent approximation problem
associated with measuring distances between belief function using classical
Lp norms, in both belief and mass spaces. This is motivated by the fact that
consistent belief functions live in a simplicial complex defined in terms of
the L∞ norm. The obtained approximations typically have straightforward
interpretations in terms of degrees of belief or mass redistribution. The
interpretation of the polytope of all L∞ solutions is a bit more complex, and
worth to be fully investigated in the near future, in the light of the interesting
analogy with the polytope of consistent probabilities.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 5. The desired orthogonality condition reads as
〈~mb− ~mcs, ~mB − ~m{x}〉 = 0 where ~mb− ~mcs is given by Equation (10), while
~mB− ~m{x}(C) = 1 if C = B, = −1 if C = {x}, 0 elsewhere. Therefore, using
once again the variables {β(B)}, the condition simplifies as follows:
〈~mb − ~mcs, ~mB − ~m{x}〉 =
{
β(B)− β({x}) = 0 ∀B ) {x}, B 6= Θ;
−β(x) = 0 B = Θ. (34)
When using the (N−1)-dimensional representation (19) of mass vectors, the
orthogonality condition reads instead as:
〈~mb − ~mcs, ~mB − ~m{x}〉 = β(B)− β({x}) = 0 ∀ B ) {x}. (35)
In the N − 2 representation, by (34) we have that β(B) = 0, i.e., mcs(B) =
mb(B) ∀B ⊇ {x}, B 6= Θ. By normalization we get mcs(Θ) = mb(Θ) +
mb(x
c): but this is exactly the L1 approximation (13).
In the N − 1 representation, the orthogonality condition (35) reads as
mcs(B) = mcs(x) +mb(B)−mb(x) ∀B ) {x}.
By normalizing it we get:
∑
{x}⊆B⊆Θmcs(B) = mcs(x)+
∑
{x}(B⊆Θmcs(B) =
2|Θ|−1mcs(x)+plb(x)−2|Θ|−1mb(x) = 1, i.e., mcs(x) = mb(x)+(1−plb(x))/2|Θ|−1,
as there are 2|Θ|−1 subsets in the ultrafilter containing x. By replacing the
value of mcs(x) into the first equation we get (20).
Proof of Lemma 1. We first note that, by definition of categorical belief
function bA, 〈~bB,~bC〉 =
∑
D⊇B,C;D 6=Θ 1 =
∑
E((B∪C)c 1 = 2
|(B∪C)c| − 1. Hence:
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∑
B⊆A
〈~bB,~bC〉(−1)|B\A| =
∑
B⊆A
(2|(B∪C)
c| − 1)(−1)|B\A|
=
∑
B⊆A
2|(B∪C)
c|(−1)|B\A| −
∑
B⊆A
(−1)|B\A| =
∑
B⊆A
2|(B∪C)
c|(−1)|B\A| (36)
as
∑
B⊆A
(−1)|B\A| =
|B\A|∑
k=0
1|A
c|−k(−1)k = 0 by Newton’s binomial:
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
pkqn−k =
(p+ q)n. Now, as both B ⊇ A and C ⊇ A the set B can be decomposed into
the disjoint sum B = A+B′+B′′, where ∅ ⊆ B′ ⊆ C \A, ∅ ⊆ B′′ ⊆ (C∪A)c.
Therefore (36) becomes:
∑
∅⊆B′⊆C\A
∑
∅⊆B′′⊆(C∪A)c
2|(A∪C)|
c−|B′′|(−1)|B′|+|B′′| =
=
∑
∅⊆B′⊆C\A
(−1)|B′|
∑
∅⊆B′′⊆(C∪A)c
(−1)|B′′|2|(A∪C)|c−|B′′|, where∑
∅⊆B′′⊆(C∪A)c
(−1)|B′′|2|(A∪C)|c−|B′′| = [2 + (−1)]|(A∪C)|c = 1|(A∪C)|c = 1, again by
Newton’s binomial. The quantity (36) is therefore equal to
∑
∅⊆B′⊆C\A
(−1)|B′|,
which is nil for C \ A 6= ∅, equal to 1 when C ⊆ A.
Proof of Theorem 7. The L1 distance between the partial approxima-
tion and ~b can be easily computed as: ‖~b− ~csxB,L1 [b]‖L1 =
=
∑
A⊆Θ
|b(A)− csxB,L1 [b](A)|
=
∑
A 6⊃{x}
|b(A)− 0|+
∑
A⊇{x}
∣∣∣b(A)− ∑
B⊆A,B⊇{x}
mcs(B)
∣∣∣
=
∑
A 6⊃{x}
b(A) +
∑
A⊇{x}
∣∣∣ ∑
B⊆A
mb(B)−
∑
B⊆A,B⊇{x}
(mb(B) +mb(B \ {x}))
∣∣∣
=
∑
A 6⊃{x}
b(A) +
∑
A⊇{x}
∣∣∣ ∑
B⊆A,B 6⊃{x}
mb(B)−
∑
B⊆A,B⊇{x}
mb(B \ {x})
∣∣∣
=
∑
A 6⊃{x}
b(A) +
∑
A⊇{x}
∣∣∣ ∑
C⊆A\{x}
mb(C)−
∑
C⊆A\{x}
mb(C)
∣∣∣
=
∑
A 6⊃{x}
b(A) =
∑
A⊆{x}c
b(A).
Proof of Theorem 8. The L2 distance between the partial approxima-
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tion and ~b can be easily computed as: ‖~b− ~csxB,L2 [b]‖2 =
=
∑
A⊆Θ
(b(A)− csxB,L2 [b](A))2 =
∑
A⊆Θ
(∑
B⊆A
mb(B)−
∑
B⊆A,B⊇{x}
mcs(B)
)2
=
∑
A⊆Θ
(∑
B⊆A
mb(B)−
∑
B⊆A,B⊇{x}
mb(B)−
∑
B⊆A,B⊇{x}
mb(B \ {x})
)2
=
∑
A 6⊃{x}
(b(A))2 +
∑
A⊇{x}
( ∑
B⊆A,B 6⊃{x}
mb(B)−
∑
B⊆A,B⊇{x}
mb(B \ {x})
)2
=
∑
A 6⊃{x}
(b(A))2 +
∑
A⊇{x}
( ∑
C⊆A\{x}
mb(C)−
∑
C⊆A\{x}
mb(C)
)2
so that ‖~b− ~csxB,L2 [b]‖2 =
∑
A 6⊃{x}
(b(A))2 =
∑
A⊆{x}c
(b(A))2.
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